

1. We require one important clarification of your 14 March 1972 memorandum. This question concerns residual U.S. force levels.

- A. What B-52 sortie rate should be projected?
- B. What U.S. Tactical Air and Naval sortie rates should be projected? And how many U.S. military personnel would be located in South Vietnam associated with this mission?
- C. What helicopter sortie rates should be projected and how will these be broken down geographically and by type of mission?
- D. To meet the assumption that direct U.S. military support should be projected to decline, we will assume that no U.S. combat troops will be available. Assuming three low U.S. personnel levels, say 10,000, 20,000 and 40,000 man levels, how would they ideally be apportioned amongst the following missions?
  - 1. Combat support by type
  - 2. Combat service support by type
  - 3. Air transport
  - 4. Advisory systems
  - 5. Self support and headquarters
  - 6. Process of deactivating and shipping U.S. equipment.

2. If the answers to this set of questions are to be useful we will need them forthwith. This will require someone being willing to make an initial judgement rather than a detailed study.

3. In addition there are a number of areas for which we would like information. These will have to be already produced reports, studies, and memoranda if we are to receive them in time for consideration in our assessment.

- A. What is the capability of the North Vietnamese Air Force to expand in the short run? That is, to acquire and operate attack aircraft outside North Vietnam's borders over the next year or two.
- B. Vietnamization plans and programs over the next year in being and being considered.
  - 1) Organizational changes such as the activation of the second 175 mm. battalion and the current consideration of an additional helicopter squadron for MR2, etc.
  - 2) Performance and operational levels such as planned sortie levels by type and by MR.

This question probably can be partially answered by NSDM 118 and subsequent changes and progress reports.

- C. VNAF Status Review, a periodical published by the U.S. Air Force. We would like to be placed on distribution.
- D. Studies or reports assessing the quality of VNAF operations by type.
- E. Recent reports assessing ARVN units and operations. The kind of reports we expect the MR or division level advisors provide to COMUS MACV on a regular basis.
- F. Operational flying restrictions for B-52's, gunships, and other aircraft; in particular, in what areas are aircraft unable to operate because of the high threat from enemy air defense?
- G. What portion of in-country transport sorties (by type of aircraft) flown in support of ARVN are flown by US pilots? What is planned over the next year? This information is essential in order to project VNAF capability for assuming the primary responsibility for the movement of troops and supplies in-country. The same information is required with respect to ARVN ground (and water-borne) transport capability.

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- H. Will residual US Forces over the next year be largely employed in assisting ARVN improve its logistical capability?
- I. What are the major shortcomings of the ARVN in-country logistical support capability?

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